VERIFY bug fixes

This commit is contained in:
NIIBE Yutaka
2011-05-11 23:33:38 +09:00
parent d5e2950f46
commit 74b21d307c
4 changed files with 62 additions and 60 deletions

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
2011-05-11 NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org> 2011-05-11 NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* src/ac.c (verify_pso_cds, verify_other): Fail (with no counter
update) if key is not registered yet.
(verify_admin_0): Compare to OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3 when empty
PW3 and non-empty PW1 but signing key is not registered yet.
* tool/gnuk_put_binary.py: New implementation by pyscard. * tool/gnuk_put_binary.py: New implementation by pyscard.
* src/main.c (device_initialize_once): New. * src/main.c (device_initialize_once): New.

110
src/ac.c
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@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int
verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len) verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
{ {
int r; int r;
uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_SIZE_PW1]; uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1)) if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1))
return 0; return 0;
@@ -71,16 +71,17 @@ verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
DEBUG_INFO ("verify_pso_cds\r\n"); DEBUG_INFO ("verify_pso_cds\r\n");
DEBUG_BYTE (pw_len); DEBUG_BYTE (pw_len);
keystring[0] = pw_len; sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring);
sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring+1); if ((r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring)) < 0)
if ((r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring+1)) < 0)
{ {
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1); gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return r; return -1;
} }
else else if (r == 0)
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1); /* No key is available. Fail even if password can match. */
return -1;
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
auth_status |= AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED; auth_status |= AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED;
return 1; return 1;
} }
@@ -88,39 +89,29 @@ verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
int int
verify_other (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len) verify_other (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
{ {
const uint8_t *ks_pw1; int r1, r2;
uint8_t pw1_keystring[KEYSTRING_SIZE_PW1]; uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
DEBUG_INFO ("verify_other\r\n"); DEBUG_INFO ("verify_other\r\n");
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1)) if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1))
return 0; return 0;
ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1); sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring);
if ((ks_pw1 == NULL && pw_len == strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1)) if ((r1 = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_DECRYPTION, BY_USER, keystring)) < 0
|| (ks_pw1 != NULL && pw_len == ks_pw1[0])) || (r2 = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_AUTHENTICATION, BY_USER,
{ /* No problem */ keystring)) < 0)
pw1_keystring[0] = pw_len;
sha1 (pw, pw_len, pw1_keystring+1);
if (gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_DECRYPTION, BY_USER,
pw1_keystring + 1) < 0)
goto error;
if (gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_AUTHENTICATION, BY_USER,
pw1_keystring + 1) < 0)
goto error;
/* Reset counter as it's success now */
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
auth_status |= AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED;
return 1;
}
else
{ {
error:
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1); gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return 0; return -1;
} }
else if (r1 == 0 && r2 == 0)
/* No key is available. Fail even if password can match. */
return -1;
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
auth_status |= AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED;
return 1;
} }
/* /*
@@ -203,41 +194,42 @@ verify_admin_0 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known)
} }
else else
{ {
const uint8_t *ks_pw1; const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
uint8_t pw1_keystring[KEYSTRING_SIZE_PW1];
ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1); if (ks_pw1 != NULL)
if (ks_pw1 == NULL) { /* empty PW3, but PW1 exists */
{ /* int r;
* For empty PW3 with empty PW1, pass phrase should be uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
* OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3
*/
if ((pw_len_known >=0
&& pw_len_known != strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3))
|| buf_len < (int)strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3)
|| strncmp ((const char *)pw, OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3,
strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3)) != 0)
goto failure;
pw_len = strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3);
admin_authorized = BY_ADMIN;
goto success;
}
else /* empty PW3, but PW1 exists */
{
pw_len = ks_pw1[0]; pw_len = ks_pw1[0];
if (pw_len_known < 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len) if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len)
goto failure; goto failure;
pw1_keystring[0] = pw_len; sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring);
sha1 (pw, pw_len, pw1_keystring+1); if ((r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring))
if (gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, < 0)
pw1_keystring + 1) < 0)
goto failure; goto failure;
else if (r > 0)
admin_authorized = BY_USER; {
goto success; admin_authorized = BY_USER;
goto success;
}
/* if r == 0 (no signing key), then fall through */
} }
/*
* For the case of empty PW3 (with empty PW1 or no signing key yet),
* pass phrase should be OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3
*/
pw_len = strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3);
if ((pw_len_known >=0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len
|| strncmp ((const char *)pw, OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3, pw_len))
goto failure;
admin_authorized = BY_ADMIN;
goto success;
} }
} }

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@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct key_data_internal {
struct prvkey_data { struct prvkey_data {
const uint8_t *key_addr; const uint8_t *key_addr;
/* /*
* CRM: [C]heck, [R]andom, and [M]agic in struct key_data * CRM: [C]heck, [R]andom, and [M]agic in struct key_data_internal
* *
*/ */
uint8_t crm_encrypted[ADDITIONAL_DATA_SIZE]; uint8_t crm_encrypted[ADDITIONAL_DATA_SIZE];

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@@ -1070,6 +1070,11 @@ gpg_data_scan (const uint8_t *p_start)
digital_signature_counter = (dsc_h14 << 10) | dsc_l10; digital_signature_counter = (dsc_h14 << 10) | dsc_l10;
} }
/*
* Write all data to newly allocated Flash ROM page (from P_START),
* updating PW1_LIFETIME_P, PW_ERR_COUNTER_P, and DO_PTR.
* Called by flash_copying_gc.
*/
void void
gpg_data_copy (const uint8_t *p_start) gpg_data_copy (const uint8_t *p_start)
{ {