fix auth conditions

This commit is contained in:
NIIBE Yutaka
2013-10-11 13:37:43 +09:00
parent b7e4f90d96
commit 5c74f11ed2
4 changed files with 29 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
2013-10-11 Niibe Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* src/ac.c (verify_user_0, verify_admin_00): Fix conditions.
* src/openpgp-do.c (gpg_do_write_prvkey): Delete keystring
information from data object of NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW3.
Fix conditions.
(gpg_do_keygen): Likewise.
* src/openpgp.c (cmd_reset_user_password): Likewise.
2013-10-10 Niibe Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>

View File

@@ -109,8 +109,9 @@ verify_user_0 (uint8_t access, const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
if (r1 < 0 || r2 < 0
|| (r1 == 0 && r2 == 0 && ks_pw1 != NULL
&& memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_pw1),
keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0))
&& ((ks_pw1[0] & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT) == 0
|| memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_pw1),
keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)))
{
failure:
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
@@ -182,7 +183,8 @@ verify_admin_00 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
if (r1 < 0 || r2 < 0)
return -1;
else if (r1 == 0 && r2 == 0)
if (memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks), keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
if ((ks[0] & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT) == 0
|| memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks), keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
return -1;
return pw_len;

View File

@@ -853,15 +853,11 @@ gpg_do_write_prvkey (enum kind_of_key kk, const uint8_t *key_data, int key_len,
memcpy (pd->iv, iv, INITIAL_VECTOR_SIZE);
memcpy (pd->checksum_encrypted, kdi.checksum, DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE);
if (ks_pw1)
{
ks_pw1_len = ks_pw1[0];
encrypt_dek (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_pw1), pd->dek_encrypted_1);
if ((ks_pw1_len & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT))
if (ks_pw1 && ((ks_pw1_len = ks_pw1[0]) & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT))
{
ks_info0[0] = ks_pw1_len & PW_LEN_MASK;
memcpy (KS_GET_SALT (ks_info0), KS_GET_SALT (ks_pw1), SALT_SIZE);
}
encrypt_dek (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_pw1), pd->dek_encrypted_1);
}
else
{
@@ -872,15 +868,11 @@ gpg_do_write_prvkey (enum kind_of_key kk, const uint8_t *key_data, int key_len,
encrypt_dek (ks, pd->dek_encrypted_1);
}
if (ks_rc)
{
ks_rc_len = ks_rc[0];
encrypt_dek (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_rc), pd->dek_encrypted_2);
if ((ks_rc_len & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT))
if (ks_rc && ((ks_rc_len = ks_rc[0]) & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT))
{
ks_info1[0] = ks_rc_len & PW_LEN_MASK;
memcpy (KS_GET_SALT (ks_info1), KS_GET_SALT (ks_rc), SALT_SIZE);
}
encrypt_dek (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_rc), pd->dek_encrypted_2);
}
else
memset (pd->dek_encrypted_2, 0, DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE);
@@ -1742,15 +1734,21 @@ gpg_do_keygen (uint8_t kk_byte)
/* GnuPG expects it's ready for signing. */
/* Don't call ac_reset_pso_cds here, but load the private key */
if (ks_pw1)
ks = KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_pw1);
else
if (ks_pw1 == NULL)
{
const uint8_t * pw = (const uint8_t *)OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1;
s2k (NULL, 0, pw, strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1), keystring);
ks = keystring;
}
else
if ((ks_pw1[0] & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT) != 0)
ks = KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_pw1);
else
{
GPG_ERROR ();
return;
}
gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, ks);
}

View File

@@ -526,7 +526,9 @@ cmd_reset_user_password (void)
}
else if (r == 0)
{
if (memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_rc), old_ks, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
if ((ks_rc[0] & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT) == 0
|| memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks_rc),
old_ks, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
goto sec_fail;
DEBUG_INFO ("done (no prvkey).\r\n");
new_ks0[0] |= PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT;